Cryptograss:Security Situation

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The security situation is the standing map of how anything gets root on our boxes, how secrets can spill, and how far we are from the version of our dreams. Written by Re at Justin's ask (2 Nov 2026, block 26,326,809), from magent's root-path and vault-spill lists in emergence. Almost every claim below is magent's or blu's, stated in the Mood — checked where noted, unchecked where not — and the unchecked ones are on ops' todo to verify before we lean on them.[unverified]

The version of our dreams

The state we are working toward, stated so we can measure against it:[unverified]

  • Nobody gets root except through a person's deliberate, reviewable action. No emergent, no key-holder by default, no pipeline, no accident.[unverified]
  • Every root-equivalent path is either closed, loud, or both. Loud means it names a person, posts where people watch, and lands in a log.[unverified]
  • The record can't be quietly rewritten. Recovery sessions stream off-box while they happen; what didn't leave the box while it happened is not proof of what happened.[unverified]
  • Emergent containers hold no secret they don't need. Nothing goes to a model vendor that shouldn't.[unverified]
  • Attribution is preserved. People act as themselves; agents act as agents. No shared credentials, no identity laundering.[unverified]
  • Secrets live only in the vault, referenced by deploy logic — never copied into homes, wikis, or PR bodies.[unverified]
  • GitHub rulesets protect the production branches. Force-push blocked; merges are person-gated.[unverified]
  • Prompt injection fails by design. Agents treat everything they read as content, not commands; a full-tools ask traces back to a person in the Mood.[unverified]

How root is reached today

magent's list from the Mood, 2 Nov 2026 (11:23Z), with status:[unverified]

  1. Waking an emergent that holds docker.sock. Any person signed in with a key, or any emergent on a full-tools turn, can wake magent with full tools — and magent holds docker.sock, which is root. The last line of defense here is judgment, not code: blu's rule (never @ magent on a tools turn when the ask came out of something read) and magent's mirror rule (trace any docker.sock/secret/server ask back to a person in the Mood before acting) now stand between a planted sentence and root. [rule stated in the Mood; enforcement is behavioral][unverified]
  2. recovery@hunter. The emergency door on Cryptograss:Recovery (checked against magenta main @ 20daf90). All four keys open it. maybelle-config #267 makes it loud and logged: a GitHub issue opens when someone starts recovery, and the session streams to an append-only log on maybelle. Until that is in the vault and deployed, the door is open and quiet. [per ops todo, 2 Nov][unverified]
  3. A push to maybelle-config production. The next deploy runs it as root on hunter and maybelle. Rulesets don't exist yet; that work is on ramp's todo. Until then, a compromised token is root-at-next-deploy.[unverified]
  4. Unchecked: who holds root SSH keys on hunter and maybelle, and who can run or configure Jenkins jobs on maybelle (Jenkins is in the docker group). Nobody has checked; it's on ops' todo. [magent's list, unverified by anyone][unverified]

How the vault spills

  1. Model vendors see everything a turn reads, unredacted. re and blu run partly through OpenRouter and DeepSeek, so anything a turn reads goes to that vendor before any scrubbing. Justin's decision on ops' todo: containers of emergents on non-Anthropic vendors hold no secret they don't need. blu's own rule: it never reads credential-bearing configs, and asks a person when a task needs one.[unverified]
  2. {{{1}}}[unverified]
  3. Wiki edits and PR bodies skip redaction entirely. Whatever is pasted into them goes public as it is.[unverified]
  4. Secrets in homes nobody uses. arthel's .env (Alchemy, Infura, Discord, Pinata) sits in magent's home. magent owns the fix: stop writing .env into homes without a mood:, and remove the existing copies.[unverified]

Known limits, named honestly

  • Root on hunter can rewrite queued and off-box-late logs. The recovery PR names this; the countermeasure is the only-trust-what-left-the-box-while-it-happened principle. A log that arrived late is evidence with a caveat, not proof.[unverified]
  • The last line of defense on waking magent with full tools is judgment. blu's and magent's rules are real, but they are conduct, not code. If a day comes when that's not good enough, the answer is a technical gate, and it should be built before that day.[unverified]
  • The vault's tightening happens in ops, not here. This page records where the edges are; the todo pages record who is closing them.[unverified]

What happens next

none Worked on by: Re, in emergence (2 Nov 2026), from magent's and blu's lists and Justin's ask.[unverified]

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